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1 Introduction 
 
It remains commonplace in work on the semantics of definiteness (e.g. Abbott, 2004; 
Poesio, 2004) to talk of an ongoing debate: is the key feature of this category 
uniqueness (after Russell, 1905) or familiarity/identifiability (after Christophersen, 
1939; Heim, 1983, 1988)? The main contention of this article is that this debate has in 
fact long been redundant: in his (1978) book and (1991) article Hawkins gives a 
characterization of definiteness based on uniqueness (and only indirectly involving 
familiarity/identifiability) which, although imperfectly formulated, ought to have put 
this debate to rest. 
Hawkins’ work on definiteness is widely cited, but typically only as one of many 
more or less inadequate approaches to this issue. There are several likely reasons for 
this lack of appreciation. First of all, the basic insight – that the essence of 
definiteness crucially involves pragmatic inferencing – will be unpalatable to those 
who continue to deny a role for pragmatics in establishing the literal content of an 
utterance (‘what is said’; see Löbner, 1985 for a prominent approach to definiteness in 
this tradition, and Lucas, 2011 for a critical discussion thereof). I will assume here 
without further discussion that inference plays a key role in establishing what is said 
(see, e.g., Récanati, 1994 for a discussion of the relevant issues). Second, there are 
various potentially distracting inconsistencies in the terms in which Hawkins 
expresses his theory, and several of the key concepts are given intuitive 
characterizations rather than clear definitions. Third, there is the matter of perceived 
counterexamples to this and all theories of definiteness which attempt to reduce the 
phenomenon to just uniqueness or just familiarity/identifiability. 
Against this background, this article has two main aims. The first is to show that 
Hawkins’ approach is fundamentally on the right track, but that it is best formulated in 
consistently relevance-theoretic and, in particular, procedural-encoding terms 
(Blakemore, 1987, 2002; Sperber & Wilson, 1995), and that relevance theory provides 
the appropriate tools for supplying the missing definitions of some of the key 
concepts. The second aim is to defend this procedural version of Hawkins’ theory 
from a commonly cited class of apparent counterexamples, which I will argue are 
simply one particular manifestation of the wider phenomenon of presupposition 
failure with accommodation. As we will see, a significant advantage of an approach to 
definiteness based on procedural encoding is that it gives us a basis for explaining 
why accommodation is possible (and commonplace) in some contexts and rare or 
impossible in others. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of previous 
approaches to definiteness. Section 3 first outlines the major usage types of definite 
NPs and presents Hawkins’ theory, and then shows how, suitably revised, this theory 
can account for all of these uses. Section 4 applies the theory to cases of 
presupposition failure with accommodation. Section 5 concludes the article. 
 
 
2 The background to uniqueness and familiarity/identifiability 
 
As is well known, work on the semantics of definite noun phrases (NPs) in the 
modern era begins with Russell (1905). Russell examined sentences such as: 
 
(1) The king of France is bald. 
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He concluded that sentences such as these, in which a denoting expression of the form 
‘the F’ (called a ‘definite description’ in the philosophical literature) appears as 
grammatical subject, are misleading as to their logical form. This he analysed as a 
conjunction of three propositions: 
 
(i)    ∃x (koF(x)) 
(ii)   ∀y (koF(y) → y = x) 
(iii)  Bald(x) 
 
These propositions express an existential claim in (i), a uniqueness claim in (ii) and a 
predication claim in (iii), and can be paraphrased as follows: 
 
(i`)    There is at least one king of France. 
(ii`)   There is at most one king of France. 
(iii`)  This entity is bald. 
 
Russell claimed that, in asserting  (1), a speaker asserts all three of these propositions 
conjoined, and that therefore, if any of them is false then the whole conjunction is 
false. Thus, for example, if one were to assert  (1) in 2011, this would be a false 
statement, since the existential claim in (i) is (at present) false. The influence of 
Russell’s theory of descriptions has been long-lasting: a prominent recent defence is 
Neale (1990). 
The theory has not been without its critics, however. One of the better known is 
Strawson (1950, 1952). Strawson’s principal objection had to do with the logical 
status of the existential and uniqueness claims. Strawson suggested that when a 
speaker utters  (1) it is only, in fact, the predication claim in (iii) that she asserts.1 The 
first two conjuncts of Russell’s analysis, he argued, are merely presupposed in an 
utterance of the sentence in  (1). We return to this point shortly.  
The first major work to suggest that familiarity or identifiability, rather than 
uniqueness, lies at the heart of definiteness is Christophersen’s (1939, p. 28): 
 
“Now the speaker must always be supposed to know which individual he is thinking 
of; the interesting thing is that the the-form supposes that the addressee knows it too. 
For the proper use of the form it is necessary that it should call up in the addressee’s 
mind the image of the exact individual that the speaker is thinking of.”  
 
This shared knowledge on the part of speaker and addressee Christophersen 
characterizes as mutual familiarity, but he himself recognises that the term 
‘familiarity’ does not always seem the right one in describing many felicitous uses of 
the definite article, and that “it is often only indirectly that one is familiar with what is 
denoted by a word” (1939, p. 73). He gives the following example, in which, talking 
about a certain book, we might say: 
 
(2) The author is unknown. 
 
Part of understanding the meaning of the predicate ‘unknown’ in this sentence is 
knowing that neither speaker nor addressee can possibly be familiar with the referent 
                                                 
1
 Following the common convention, throughout this article I refer to the speaker of an utterance as 
female and the addressee as male. 
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of ‘the author’. However, what is certainly true is that there exists an “unambiguous 
relation” (Christophersen, 1939, p. 73) between a book and its author, and this relation 
must be familiar to both speaker and addressee for such a use of a definite description 
to be felicitous. Hawkins (1978, p. 123) calls this an “associative relationship”.2 He 
gives the following examples: 
 
(3) The man drove past our house in a car. The exhaust fumes were terrible. 
(4) The man drove past our house in a car. The dog was barking furiously. 
 
In  (3) you have what Hawkins calls an ‘associative anaphoric use’ of a definite 
description. ‘The dog’ in  (4), by contrast, cannot be interpreted in this way. For this 
sentence to be uttered felicitously the addressee must be familiar (in the ordinary 
sense) with the referent of ‘the dog’, or else it must have been mentioned previously 
in the discourse. Hawkins’ explanation for this phenomenon is as follows: 
 
“…even though dogs often travel in cars, and though birds often make their nests 
under house roofs etc., neither a car: the dog, nor a house: the bird’s nest are possible 
association sequences. Either these associates are not part of the relevant domains 
with sufficient generality, or else, even if they are part of some domain, they are not 
somehow considered to constitute an important enough part.” (Hawkins, 1978, p. 
124) 
 
He goes on to point out that one could imagine a world in which car owners regularly 
kept dogs in their cars as a security measure. In such a world ‘the dog’ in (4) would 
represent a perfectly acceptable associative anaphoric use. Similarly, one could 
imagine a world in which cars no longer emitted any exhaust fumes, in which case a 
car: the exhaust fumes would no longer be a possible association sequence, and the 
exhaust fumes in  (3) could only refer to some other entity not connected with the car, 
but which the addressee could identify.  
A more recent account also based on the concept of familiarity is Heim’s (1983) 
file-change semantics, though the familiarity here is with a discourse referent (in the 
sense of Karttunen, 1976). The focus on discourse represents a significant advance 
over Christophersen’s theory in that it allows Heim to account for many felicitous 
uses of definite NPs whose referents cannot be familiar to the addressee because their 
reference is non-specific. Take the following for example: 
 
(5) If I had a gun right now, I’d use it. 
 
The NP a gun in  (5) clearly does not refer to any particular gun, and yet the pronoun 
it, which is inherently definite, is in an (entirely felicitous) anaphoric relationship with 
it. Heim’s account of this phenomenon is as follows. Addressees make sense of 
discourse by keeping a ‘file’ which contains separate ‘cards’ for each discourse 
referent. In (5) the indefinite NP a gun introduces a new discourse referent which 
requires the addressee to create for it a new card. This card is then updated in the 
course of the discourse every time a definite description or any definite NP (such as it 
in (5)) occurs in an anaphoric relationship with that discourse referent. 
However, despite its advantages, Heim’s approach cannot account for all 
felicitous uses of definite NPs. An utterance of  (6), for example, is perfectly felicitous 
                                                 
2
 Elsewhere this phenomenon tends to be known as ‘bridging’ (see Clark & Haviland, 1977; Clark & 
Marshall, 1981), but I retain Hawkins’ terminology here. 
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in a context in which the ‘front page’ in question is both discourse-new and 
addressee-new (in the sense of Prince, 1981). 
 
(6) There was a funny story on the front page of the Guardian this morning. 
 
In such a context there would be no existing file card under Heim’s system for the 
definite NP the front page to update, nor is it related to such a card by an associative 
relationship. 
It should be clear from this brief overview of previous approaches that both 
uniqueness and familiarity/identifiability are relevant to the meaning of definiteness, 
but that familiarity or identifiability alone cannot be sufficient.
3
 As we will see, 
Hawkins’ account, which we turn to in the following section, takes uniqueness as the 
essence of definiteness, with identifiability only partially retained in terms of the 
notion of mutual manifestness. 
 
 
3 Hawkins on definiteness 
 
A particular advantage over previous (and subsequent) treatments of definiteness that 
Hawkins’ (1978) work has is its concern for empirical coverage. The theory presented 
in this work (and developed in Hawkins, 1991) emerges naturally out of (what 
Hawkins claims to be) “an exhaustive look at usage possibilities” of the definite and 
indefinite articles (Hawkins, 1978, p. 90). This is in marked distinction to the 
approaches detailed in the previous section, which come in for detailed criticism in 
Hawkins (1978). His critique of Russell’s approach is the most instructive for present 
purposes. 
 
 
3.1  Hawkins on Russell 
 
Hawkins identifies three principal defects of Russell’s theory of descriptions. First, he 
echoes Strawson’s (1950, p. 234) objection concerning the logical status of the 
existential and uniqueness claims: Russell’s assertion that  (1) is false if uttered in a 
context in which there is no king of France simply doesn’t correspond with typical 
native-speaker intuitions. If some property is falsely predicated of a familiar, real-life 
entity – as in  (7) – then we are happy to say that the statement is false in this context. 
 
                                                 
3
 Birner & Ward (1994) suggest that familiarity/identifiability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for definiteness marking, which certainly seems correct, and that uniqueness is a sufficient, 
but not a necessary condition, pointing to examples similar to those in (i) and (ii). 
 
(i) I’m going to Dublin for the first time next week. I intend to spend most of my time there in the pub. 
(ii) He then came to the bank of a river. 
 
It is certainly the case that there is no suggestion of uniqueness in either of the definite-marked NPs in 
these examples, but neither can their referents be in any sense familiar or identifiable to the addressee. 
They are thus problematic for any theory of definiteness based on either of these concepts, raising the 
possibility that the presence of the form the in examples such as these is a fossil which does not in fact 
mark these NPs as semantically definite, just as in, for example, the comparative correlative 
construction (e.g., the more, the merrier), or generics, where definiteness and indefiniteness marking 
are largely interchangeable. See Carlson, Sussman, Klein, & Tanenhaus (2006) and Lucas (2011) for 
further discussion of these so-called ‘weak definites’. 
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(7) The queen of England is bald. 
 
However, many would be unwilling to say that an assertion now of the sentence in  (8) 
is false, on an ordinary understanding of this term: 
 
(8) The president of England is bald. 
 
 (8) is certainly grammatically well-formed and clearly meaningful; but it does not 
seem to express a comprehensible proposition, and it is for this reason that we are 
reluctant to describe it as false. We understand ‘the president of England’ as a 
referring expression with no referent and as such have no proposition about which to 
make a judgment (see Glanzberg, 2003 for further elucidation of this point). 
Hawkins’ second criticism is closely linked to the first. It is not only the logical 
status of the existential and uniqueness claims that Russell exaggerates, but also their 
illocutionary status. Following Searle (1969), Hawkins argues that to insist that the 
existential/uniqueness claims are assertions of a sentence containing a definite 
description, “is to confuse the assertion of existence and uniqueness […] with what it 
is to refer to a unique and existing object in natural language” (1978, p. 95). This 
reformulation in speech act terms certainly seems to accord better with a common-
sense view of what it is that one actually asserts in uttering a definite description-
containing sentence, and what one refers to in making the assertion. It is also much 
more amenable to a broadly Gricean notion of what is said by an utterance.
4
 To 
illustrate this point, consider  (9): 
 
(9) Queen Elizabeth II of England is bald. 
 
To the untrained eye,  (9) looks very similar to  (7): the referent of the subject term is 
the same, and the predicate is identical. We can agree that what is said by an utterance 
of  (9) is a simple proposition consisting of a one-place predicate and its argument: 
 
(10) Bald(e) 
 
However, it seems perverse for Russellians to insist that the proposition expressed by 
an utterance of  (7), which serves to predicate the same property of the same entity, is 
in fact the conjunction of three propositions as given above. 
The third defect of Russell’s theory that Hawkins highlights is its incompleteness: 
 
“There is simply much more to the meaning of the definite article than Russell allows 
for. For example, Russell is concerned almost exclusively with the definite article 
before singular count nouns. And yet mass nouns and plurals, which scarcely refer to 
unique individuals, seem to take a definite article under basically similar 
circumstances to singular count nouns. In addition, pragmatic aspects of meaning 
[such as how the reference of incomplete descriptions is narrowed down in context] 
are wholly neglected…” (Hawkins, 1978, p. 96) 
 
While this criticism seems entirely justified as it relates to Russell’s own formulation 
of the theory of descriptions, the theory is clearly capable of being extended to cope 
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 This is not to imply that Grice himself took this view. On the contrary, Grice (1969) argues (not 
necessarily conclusively) for a standard Russellian analysis of what is said in definite description-
containing sentences. 
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with plural definite descriptions (see Neale, 1990, pp. 45–47). Whether the theory so 
extended is the best analysis of the linguistic facts is another matter. Let us therefore 
turn to Hawkins’ investigation of definite NPs and the theory he proposes. 
 
 
3.2 Hawkins’ own approach 
 
As already noted, a major benefit of Hawkins’ work on definiteness, in addition to his 
theory of its meaning, is his meticulous presentation of the major usage types of 
definite NPs, out of which his theory develops as a unified account of the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for all of these usage types. In this same spirit, let us first 
briefly look at the six major usage types that Hawkins (1978) identifies, before 
moving on to the theory itself and how, suitably revised, it can explain each of these 
usage types. 
 
 
3.2.1 The major usage types of definite NPs 
 
I. Anaphoric uses 
 
These are often seen as the most basic uses of definite NPs, though they are further 
analysable into more and less straightforward varieties: 
 
(11) I saw an odd-looking bird in the garden yesterday. I looked the bird up in my 
guide this morning. 
(12) My car broke down again today. The stupid thing is always giving me 
trouble. 
 
In  (11) we have a first-mention indefinite NP – an odd-looking bird – in the first 
sentence, licensing a definite NP the bird as a second mention of the same referent. In 
 (12) we have the same process, except here we see that there is no necessity for the 
definite NP used anaphorically to have any of the same constituents as the first-
mention NP. 
 
II. Immediate situation uses  
 
These uses are where definite reference to some entity is licensed by the fact of its 
being detectable in the immediate physical situation of both speaker and addressee, as 
in the  (13), said by a surgeon to a nurse in an operating theatre: 
 
(13) Pass me the scalpel. 
 
III. Larger situation uses 
 
The third major usage type involves first-mention uses of definite NPs that are 
licensed either by specific shared knowledge on the part of speaker and addressee, or 
by general knowledge of various situations as to what objects they contain. Examples 
of the latter, such as  (14), are very commonplace. 
 
(14) The mayor of London is a rather dubious figure. 
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As an illustration of the former, suppose I live in a village close to a lake where 
people often go to bathe. Seeing it is a sunny day, I call up a friend from the village 
and ask, 
 
(15) Do you fancy going to the lake today? 
 
It is the shared specific knowledge between my friend and me of our larger situation, 
namely that it contains a lake that people often visit, which allows me to refer to this 
lake with a first-mention definite NP.  
 
IV. Associative anaphoric uses 
 
These are essentially a combination of usage types I and III. We have already had an 
example of such a use in  (3): 
 
(3)   A man drove past our house in a car. The exhaust fumes were terrible. 
 
Hawkins terms the first NP in uses such as these (‘a car’ in this example) ‘the trigger’, 
because it licenses subsequent definite reference to a whole range of associated 
entities (‘the associates’). For example, after ‘a car’, I could equally felicitously refer 
to ‘the steering wheel’, ‘the engine’, ‘the seats’ etc. It is, of course, general knowledge 
that cars tend to contain or be associated with such objects. Hawkins characterizes the 
relationship between the associative anaphoric use and the larger situation use as 
follows: 
 
“The trigger in the larger situation use is not an NP, but the situation of utterance 
itself. Otherwise, these two uses are the same. The range of associates which can have 
a first-mention the after a previous mention of [e.g. a car] is precisely the set which 
the speaker can refer to with a first-mention the when he is [in a car]. In these latter 
cases the situation triggers off the associations, whereas in the former cases of 
associative anaphora it is some linguistic referent which acts as trigger.” (Hawkins, 
1978, p. 125) 
 
V. ‘Unfamiliar’ uses 
 
These are uses, such as in  (6) above, which are not situational (i.e. uses II-III), not 
associates triggered by a previous discourse item (use IV), and are not characterized 
by shared knowledge of the referent on the part of speaker and addressee due to 
previous mention (use I) (Hawkins, 1978, p. 130). Unfamiliar uses come in several 
varieties. One such is where both the trigger and the associate in an associative 
anaphoric sequence come together in a genitival relationship, with the associate 
preceding the trigger. Hawkins (1978, p. 139) gives the examples in  (6) (repeated here 
as  (16)) and  (17). 
 
(16) There was a funny story on the front page of the Guardian this morning. 
(17) I remember the beginning of the war very well. 
 
Two further varieties of the unfamiliar use are what Hawkins calls the ‘NP-
complement use’ and the ‘nominal modifier use’ (exemplified in  (18) and  (19) 
respectively): 
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(18) The notion that pigs can fly is absurd. 
(19) Today’s show was brought to you by the letter ‘C’ and the number four. 
 
VI. ‘Unexplanatory modifiers’ 
 
The final major usage type is that involving a class of modifiers which have the 
property of making the definiteness-marking obligatory in any NP in which they 
appear:  
 
(20) Every year we go to the same place on holiday. 
(21) The centre of a star is unimaginably hot. 
(22) The nicest people in my class have all left. 
 
Making these descriptions indefinite renders them ungrammatical or at least strongly 
infelicitous: *a centre of a star, *a same place, *some nicest people in my class. Note 
that all superlatives belong to this class of modifiers.  
 
  
3.2.2 P-sets and uniqueness/inclusiveness  
 
How, then, are we to account for all of these usage possibilities in a unified fashion? 
Hawkins’ (1991, p. 414) summarizes his proposal as follows: 
 
(23) “The conventionally implicates that there is some subset of entities, {P}, in 
the universe of discourse which is mutually manifest to speaker and 
addressee on-line and within which definite referents exist and are unique.” 
 
The term ‘mutually manifest’ (henceforth MM) is of course due to Sperber and 
Wilson, who define it as follows (1986, pp. 39–42): “A fact [or an assumption] is 
manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of 
representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true”. If 
two or more individuals share a set of facts or assumptions, and it is manifest to each 
of them that they share them, then these facts or assumptions are MM.  
The essence of Hawkins claim, then, is that the use of a definite NP by the speaker 
is an indication to the addressee that a unique referent for that NP is to be found in 
some MM set of objects (henceforth ‘P-set’). This proves to be the most satisfactory 
characterization of the meaning of definiteness to date, and one which is capable of 
explaining all the above usage types, as we will see shortly.  
As noted in section 1, however, a shortcoming of Hawkins’ work is that he fails to 
give precise definitions of some of the basic concepts underlying this theory. Most 
notably, we are never told exactly what constitutes a P-set. Instead he illustrates what 
is an intuitively straightforward notion by means of examples connected with the 
major usage types of definite NPs presented above. For instance, in arriving at an 
interpretation of an utterance containing an anaphoric use of a definite NP as in  (11) 
above, one P-set which will become particularly relevant for the addressee in this 
context is the ‘previous discourse set’ associated with the conversation of which the 
utterance is a part. This consists of the set of entities that the speaker and addressee 
have referred to in the course of a given discourse (Hawkins, 1991, p. 408). So in 
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 (11), mention of an odd-looking bird results in the entity5 this description refers to 
being added to the MM previous discourse set, such that when the same entity is 
referred to later on in the utterance by means of the definite NP the bird, it is uniquely 
locatable in this P-set. Other P-sets will be comprised of the sets of entities which are 
MM to speaker and addressee in their immediate situation, their larger situation, or 
sets of entities which are (MM-ly) in associative relationships with one another. 
This picture is reasonable as far as it goes, but we can give a more general 
characterization of what is meant by a P-set. The P-set can be thought of as 
constituting a subset of the set of assumptions and entities MM to speaker and 
addressee at the moment of a given utterance. In addition to their MM-ness in general, 
it will furthermore be MM that the assumptions and entities which make up that 
subset have some property in common, such that they form a (MM-ly) natural class. 
This property might, for instance, take the form of an associative relationship, as in ‘a 
car’: ‘the exhaust fumes’ in  (3); or it could be membership of the set of entities 
associated by general or local knowledge with the situation of utterance, as in  (14)–
 (15), or the entities making up the previous discourse set, and so on. On this 
characterization there will be indefinitely many P-sets, with a range of different 
organizational principles, potentially accessible at a given time; but the purpose of a 
speaker and addressee’s accessing one in particular is to secure reference to the entity 
picked out by a definite NP. It is the task of the addressee to access the same P-set as 
the speaker, such that the entity referred to by the speaker in using the definite NP is 
the only entity in that P-set which fits the descriptive content of the NP in question. 
Just how the addressee achieves this task can be explained in relevance-theoretic 
terms (see Wilson, 1992 for a parallel account of reference in general). Of central 
concern here is the Communicative Principle of Relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, 
p. 260), “every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its 
own optimal relevance”, where relevance itself is defined in terms of two extent 
conditions (Sperber & Wilson 1995, pp. 265–266): 
 
(24) Relevance of a phenomenon 
Extent condition 1: A phenomenon is relevant to an individual to the extent 
that the positive cognitive effects achieved when it is optimally processed are 
large. 
Extent condition 2: A phenomenon is relevant to an individual to the extent 
that the effort required to process it optimally is small.  
 
Following the Communicative Principle, the addressee should assume that the 
appropriate P-set for a given definite NP can be accessed with minimal cognitive 
effort (given the interlocutors’ mutual cognitive environment and the form of the 
speaker’s utterance). At the same time, he should assume that accessing the 
appropriate P-set, and processing its unique token of the appropriate referent-type, 
will generate significant positive cognitive effects.  
More specifically, it is a general consequence of the Communicative Principle that 
the intended interpretation of an utterance is not necessarily identical to whichever 
interpretation happens to be most immediately accessible to the addressee at a given 
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 For the sake of brevity I will generally talk in terms of reference to entities, though this should not be 
understood as a commitment to a denotational view of reference. Any talk of reference to entities in 
this article should be taken as an abbreviation for the representational view that words (or people) refer 
to entities not directly, but via concepts of those entities, and that therefore, trivially, it is not entities 
themselves which are entered into P-sets but the concepts and assumptions which represent them.  
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moment: an utterance is relevant to the extent that it gives rise to an optimal balance 
between minimal processing effort on the one hand, and maximal positive contextual 
effects on the other. It follows, therefore, that that the appropriate P-set/referent pair 
for an addressee to select in processing a definite NP will not simply be the most 
accessible such pair at the moment of utterance. Rather, an appropriate 
comprehension procedure consistent with the Communicative Principle entails 
scanning candidate P-sets in order of accessibility until one is found containing a 
unique referent of the required sort, such that the proposition featuring this referent 
satisfies the addressee’s expectations of relevance (cf. Wilson & Sperber, 2004, 
p.613). Only at this point can the addressee assume that he has recovered the P-
set/referent pair intended by the speaker.  
Turning to the precise meaning of uniqueness, this is something which Hawkins 
does deal with explicitly. In his (1978) book, building on his criticism of Russell’s 
theory for concentrating on singular count nouns, he proposes the term ‘inclusiveness’ 
instead of uniqueness, in order to characterize how definite NPs containing singular, 
plural and non-count nouns refer. In so doing he argues for an analysis of the definite 
article as a universal quantifier, albeit one that operates within the scope of the 
relevant P-set (1978, pp. 160–161).6 Such an analysis allows for a unified theory of all 
definite descriptions and captures the regularities in the appropriateness conditions for 
plurals and mass nouns as well as singulars: a trigger such as ‘a hotel’ licenses 
definite reference to ‘the receptionists’; ‘the lake’ to ‘the water’; and in each case the 
description refers to the totality of referents fitting that description within the 
appropriate P-set (i.e. all of the water, and all of the receptionists). The crucial point is 
that this analysis captures the unique reference associated with singular count nouns 
as well: reference is still to the totality of referents fitting the description within the 
appropriate P-set – it just happens that in these cases it is a totality consisting of one 
member. In his (1991) article Hawkins abandons the term ‘inclusiveness’ and reverts 
to the more traditional term ‘uniqueness’, a purely terminological move which we will 
follow here. 
In addition to a certain vagueness in the definition of its key concepts, there is a 
perhaps more serious difficulty with the terms in which Hawkins cashes out his 
theory, particularly in its (1991) manifestation. Most notable is his division of the 
meaning of definiteness into its “logical meaning”, which he says, oddly, given his 
earlier critique of Russell, is “existence and uniqueness” (1991, p. 410), and the 
conventional implicature in  (23). Presumably on the analogy of a Gricean analysis of 
a word such as but,
7
 Hawkins feels obliged to divide the meaning of definiteness into 
its semantic and pragmatic elements, in some sense of those terms. But there is an 
evident redundancy in this approach, given that the ‘existence and uniqueness’ aspect 
of the ‘logical meaning’ is repeated in the conventional implicature in  (23). Moreover, 
the force of Hawkins’ (1978, p. 95) abovementioned arguments against seeing 
existence as part of the encoded meaning of definiteness remain: the assumption that a 
referent exists for a definite description or any other denoting phrase is, ceteris 
paribus, warranted by the Communicative Principle as soon as that phrase is used in 
an utterance (cf. Simons, 2005, p. 337). There is no good reason to suppose that 
definiteness marking encodes an actual assertion of existence. 
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 Hawkins later dropped this claim (1991, p. 409), arguably rightly so. In any case, one can retain the 
uniqueness element of Hawkins’ theory without cashing it out in terms of universal quantification. 
7
 In which but is taken to be equivalent to logical conjunction in its ‘logical meaning’ and also to carry 
a conventional implicature to the effect that there is an apparent opposition between the propositions 
expressed in the two conjuncts (see Grice, 1989). 
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What I want to argue instead is that, having taken one important idea from 
relevance theory – mutual manifestness – Hawkins would have done better to express 
the meaning of definiteness in terms of another, namely Blakemore’s (1987, 1990, 
1997) concept of procedural meaning. The essence of Hawkins’ theory is entirely 
procedural in any case – definiteness as a constraint on the inferential processes 
required for reference assignment – and a reformulation of his theory in procedural 
terms can capture his key insight more efficiently. Clearly, the definiteness-marking 
element of a definite NP contributes nothing conceptual to the meaning of that phrase, 
so there is no need to give it a ‘logical’ semantics and a ‘conventional’ pragmatics. 
We can say instead that: 
 
(25) The [+definite] status of a definite NP encodes a procedure indicating to the 
addressee that the referent of that NP is unique within some MM subset of 
assumptions and entities, {P}.  
 
On this formulation the addressee of an utterance containing a basic use of a 
definite NP, such as  (26) (= (11)), will assign reference to that phrase as follows. 
 
(26) I saw an odd-looking bird in the garden yesterday. I looked the bird up in my 
guide this morning. 
 
The bird encodes both conceptual and procedural information. The conceptual 
information is, roughly, that something compatible with the notion of birdhood is 
being referred to here. The procedural information is encoded by the definiteness 
marking and indicates that the referent of this NP is to be found in some P-set that is 
MM to speaker and addressee at the moment of the utterance, and within which that 
referent is the only entity compatible with the notion of birdhood.
8
 In this instance, the 
appropriate P-set is the set of referents in the previous discourse of the interlocutors. 
In this set both the speaker and addressee will have a single concept each representing 
the bird in question. The procedural information encoded by the definiteness marking 
in the bird gives the addressee sufficient grounds for assuming that this is the concept 
being referred to by the speaker.  
All the other usage types of definiteness marking outlined in section 3.2.1 can be 
captured by  (25) in similar fashion. 
For immediate situation uses as in  (13) the appropriate P-set is simply the set of 
objects MM in the immediate situation of the interlocutors. The referent of the scalpel 
is then necessarily unique within this P-set (and in a context where this does not hold, 
definiteness marking in  (13) is not felicitous).  
The relevant P-set in larger situation uses as in  (15) is the set of objects which 
MM-ly belong to the larger situation shared by the interlocutors. For instance, in  (15) 
two inhabitants of the same village can talk about ‘the lake’ as a first mention because 
the larger situation they share – i.e. the relevant MM P-set in this instance – includes 
the set of MM entities in the village and its immediate surroundings, and in this 
situation there is a unique lake. Again, if there had been two lakes near the village 
equally good for swimming in, then a larger situation use would not have been 
possible here.  
                                                 
8
 Strictly speaking: the only entity such that reference to it by means of the predicate ‘bird’ is consistent 
with the presumption of optimal relevance. 
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As we have seen, general knowledge larger situation uses, as in  (14), and 
associative anaphoric uses, as in  (3), resemble one another closely. In the former the 
relevant P-set is the set of entities MM-ly associated by general knowledge to the 
situation of utterance. It is general knowledge (for a certain subset interlocutors) that 
there is a single mayor of London, and this is what licenses definiteness marking in 
 (14). With associative anaphoric uses the relevant P-set is the set of entities MM-ly 
associated by general knowledge, not to the situation of utterance but to the trigger. 
So in  (3) the relevant P-set is the set of associates of ‘a car’, within which there is a 
unique referent of ‘the exhaust fumes’ (i.e. reference is to the unique maximal set of 
exhaust fumes within the P-set – the speaker is not talking about only some of the 
fumes).  
Unfamiliar genitival uses, as in  (16) and  (17), involve a P-set which is identical to 
that of the ordinary associative anaphoric use – the set of entities MM-ly associated 
by general knowledge to the trigger. The fact that the associate precedes the trigger in 
this use is unimportant in this regard, except that if the trigger is not forthcoming then 
the definite NPs (the front page and the beginning in  (16) and  (17), respectively) 
cease to be felicitous unless a unique referent for them can be found in the previous 
discourse P-set. The NP-complement and the nominal modifier varieties of unfamiliar 
use (exemplified in  (18) and  (19)) are also straightforward – the definite NP here 
simply functions to clarify the reference of the following item and to signal that it is 
being mentioned rather than used. As such, the P-set is entirely determinate. For a 
description such as ‘the notion that pigs can fly’, as in  (18), the relevant P-set is the 
set of entities corresponding to the proposition ‘pigs can fly’, which is necessarily a 
singleton set; hence the referent is necessarily unique within that P-set.  
Finally, unexplanatory modifier uses, as in  (20)– (22), also function similarly. For 
example, in  (21) there is no set of entities in which one could point to any member 
with more than one centre. This kind of idea is part of the meaning of words such as 
‘centre’ or ‘top’, or any superlative adjective, which all carry an ‘inherent uniqueness 
claim’ (Hawkins, 1991, p. 420; Löbner, 1985 calls nouns of this type ‘functional 
nouns’). So for any P-set at all in fact, the assumption that any object within that P-set 
will have a unique centre is MM to the interlocutors. Hence, use of the definite article 
with such modifiers is obligatory and the indefinite article ungrammatical or very odd. 
Similarly, regarding  (20), there is no set of entities in which one could point to two 
subsets of entities which are ‘the same’, and it be less than the unique maximal set of 
each of these subsets which satisfy this predicate. So, again, it is a direct consequence 
of the meaning of the modifier/predicate ‘same’ that it can only grammatically co-
occur with the definite article. 
This concludes the discussion of Hawkins’ theory of definiteness. I hope to have 
shown that this fundamentally pragmatic approach, developed and reformulated here 
in relevance-theoretic and procedural terms, captures the essence of what definite 
reference entails and is capable, unlike any previous theories, of giving a unified 
account of all of the major usage types of definite NPs. In the following section we 
consider a class of apparent counterexamples, which in fact turn out to offer further 
support for the procedural theory defended here. 
 
 
4 P-set presupposition failure and the limits of accommodation 
 
Consider the following sentences, uttered discourse-initially: 
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(27) Have you heard the news?! 
(28) I have some news to tell you. 
 
Typically, the function of both of these utterances will be to alert the addressee to the 
fact that the hearer has some information to impart, of which she assumes the 
addressee is unaware. The indefinite some news in  (28), which encodes nothing to 
suggest that the addressee should be aware of the news in question, is clearly suited to 
this function. According to the theory of definiteness presented in the preceding 
sections, however, the definiteness marking in the news in  (27) encodes the 
information that speaker and addressee share a MM P-set in which there is a unique 
referent for this description. How then can  (27) serve to introduce information which 
is assumed to be completely unknown to the addressee? To understand this, consider 
two possible answers to the question in  (27): 
 
(29) a. Yes. 
 b. What news? 
 
The answer in  (29)a takes the question in  (27) at face value: the addressee finds that 
there is indeed a MM P-set (roughly, the set of propositions which can be assumed to 
be general knowledge at the moment of utterance) in which there is a unique referent 
for the news (presumably information about some event so momentous that in 
comparison no other piece of new information merits the predicate ‘news’). 
Intuitively, however,  (29)a is an unusual and rather uncooperative answer to the 
question in  (27). A more typical and more cooperative answer would be something 
like  (29)b. But  (29)b is not an answer to the question as formulated. It is a 
clarification question indicating that the addressee is unable to answer the question as 
formulated, because he cannot find an appropriate referent for the news. That is, the P-
set in which the appropriate referent is unique is not manifest to the addressee and was 
therefore, strictly speaking, wrongly treated as MM by the speaker when she referred 
to it with a definite NP. In terms of the speaker’s ultimate rhetorical aims, however, 
the addressee’s response in  (29)b is the desired outcome; because in formulating her 
utterance as in  (27) she was not, despite superficial appearances, primarily seeking 
information about what the addressee does and doesn’t know; rather she was 
announcing her intention to impart some information, and seeking a response from the 
addressee which invites her to do so. The addressee’s question in  (29)b clearly 
constitutes such an invitation. 
This example illustrates two important points. The first is that speakers are 
routinely able to misrepresent the mutual cognitive environment (or ‘common 
ground’) of the interlocutors for specific rhetorical aims. The second is that where this 
kind of misrepresentation involves strictly-speaking inappropriate definiteness 
marking, it is only with the aid of a procedural theory of definiteness, taking into 
account the mutual cognitive environment of the interlocutors, that we can properly 
understand both the nature of this misrepresentation and its rhetorical consequences. 
In the example in  (27) and  (29)b there is presupposition failure without 
accommodation, but communication is successful nevertheless because the 
presupposition failure was intended by the speaker. Perhaps more common are cases 
where there is presupposition failure (intended or otherwise) but the utterance 
succeeds because, to borrow a phrase from von Fintel (2008), the addressee is able 
“quietly and without fuss” to adjust the mutual cognitive environment appropriately 
after the fact. Consider  (30), uttered by one fourteen-year-old boy to another: 
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(30) I can’t play computer games with you tonight. I’m taking my girlfriend on a 
date. 
 
Leaving aside for the moment considerations of definiteness and uniqueness, an 
utterance of  (30) containing the possessive pronoun my presupposes the MM-ness of 
the assumption that the speaker has a girlfriend. If this assumption is not manifest to 
the addressee then there is presupposition failure and  (30) is, strictly speaking, 
infelicitous (or at least misjudged) as a result. Depending what the addressee knows or 
assumes about the speaker, a number of options are now open to him. If he does not 
know the speaker well and has no prior beliefs concerning the speaker’s romantic 
attachments, but finds it plausible that someone as good-looking and confident as him 
should have a girlfriend, then he can accommodate this infelicitous utterance by 
quietly and without fuss adding this assumption to (what he takes to be) the mutual 
cognitive environment. Alternatively, he could point out that he was not aware, as the 
utterance seems to presuppose, that the speaker had a girlfriend. Or he could be 
inwardly skeptical that the speaker had a girlfriend, and privately contemptuous that 
he treated this dubious proposition as a MM assumption. Or he could openly assert 
that the speaker is being deceitful and does not have a girlfriend, and so on. The point 
is that, under the right circumstances, an utterance of  (30) can appear perfectly 
felicitous even if the assumption that the speaker has a girlfriend is not already MM. 
This is only possible, however, to the extent that the addressee is willing and able to 
accommodate by silently adding this assumption to what he takes to be the mutual 
cognitive environment.
9
 More generally, we can say that an addressee will 
accommodate a non-MM presupposition to the extent that he is willing and able to 
alter his existing set of assumptions such that the presupposition in question becomes 
MM. Thus, whether the addressee accommodates  (30) will depend on what 
assumptions, if any, he already has concerning the speaker’s romantic attachments. If 
he has a number of strongly held assumptions that are incompatible with the speaker’s 
having a girlfriend, then the addressee is likely to reject this new assumption and 
refuse to accommodate  (30) (cf. Sperber et al., 2010); and if, for some reason, the 
addressee has no concept which corresponds to the predicate ‘girlfriend’, and 
therefore no assumptions whatsoever relating to such a concept, then he will be 
unable to accommodate  (30). 
Consider in this connection the following scenario. A woman in a pub approaches 
a man she has never met before, introduces herself, and proceeds to tell him a joke. 
After delivering the punchline she utters either  (31)a or  (31)b.  
 
(31) a. The Frenchman always laughs when I tell that joke. 
 b. My dog always barks when I tell that joke. 
 
Either of these utterances would involve presupposition failure and therefore be 
infelicitous to at least some extent. But while it is easy to imagine the addressee 
accommodating  (31)b by adding to the mutual cognitive environment the assumption 
that the speaker has a dog, it is very hard to imagine him accommodating  (31)a. We 
can understand the source of this distinction in terms of the preceding discussion. A 
bona fide utterance of  (31)b involves two erroneous assumptions about what is 
                                                 
9
 If the speaker is being deceitful then this assumption will not, of course, be part of the mutual 
cognitive environment, but his aims will have been fulfilled by making the addressee believe that it is. 
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manifest to the addressee. The first is that the speaker owns one dog. The second is 
that there is a MM P-set in which there is a unique referent for ‘the speaker’s dog’. 
The speaker will certainly be able to add the first assumption to the mutual cognitive 
environment quietly and without fuss, drawing on plausible existing assumptions such 
as that people often keep dogs as pets, and that owning one dog is also common. 
Having done so, the second assumption will become true (a possible P-set being, for 
example, the set of things belonging to the speaker), and the addressee will have 
accommodated  (31)b.  
Matters are different in the case of  (31)a, however. The definiteness marking in 
the Frenchman carries with it a presupposition that there is a MM P-set in which there 
is a unique referent of which the predicate ‘Frenchman’ is true. But in the scenario 
described there can be no such MM P-set and it is very hard to see what existing 
assumption(s) the addressee could draw on, and what new assumptions he could add 
to the mutual cognitive environment, so as to make the appropriate P-set MM. Hence 
the addressee will be unable to accommodate even if he is willing to (though he can of 
course nod and smile politely as if the utterance were perfectly felicitous).
10
  
Lyons (1999, pp. 263–264) presents examples such as  (32), in which there is P-set 
presupposition failure but we can easily imagine accommodation, as problematic for 
Hawkins’ theory. 
 
(32) [Uttered in a context where the addressee is unaware that the speaker 
employs a butler] 
I’ll get the butler to show you out. 
 
Utterances such as these are indeed common, and they may well be viewed as entirely 
felicitous because they are so easily accommodated (along similar lines to  (31)b), 
despite there being no MM P-set containing a unique referent for the definite NP 
immediately prior to the utterance. But this does not mean that the theory of 
definiteness presented in  (23) and  (25) is inadequate. On the contrary, it is only in 
terms of this theory that we can understand why accommodation is possible in 
examples such as  (32) and  (31)b but impossible or very difficult in an apparently 
similar example such as  (31)a. 
                                                 
10
 This contrast in how readily the examples in  (31)a and  (31)b can be accommodated has significant 
consequences for Beaver and Zeevat’s (2007) proposals concerning why certain presuppositions cannot 
be accommodated. These authors note that where the (P-set uniqueness) presupposition associated with 
a definite description fails, this will often resist accommodation. They suggest that the only exception 
to this generalization are those definite NPs whose descriptive content alone suffices to single out the 
intended referent. They go on to generalize further (2007, pp. 530–531) that “we should expect 
accommodation to be blocked whenever it would conflict with the common ground”. But this principle 
seems to make the false prediction that not only  (31)a, but also  (31)b, should resist accommodation. 
Similarly, it leaves us with no basis for explaining why an utterance of (i), in the same context as 
 (31)a,b, should be readily accommodatable, while the apparently similar  (31)a is not. 
 
(i) The postman always laughs when I tell that joke. 
 
In line with the discussion above, we can understand the difference here in terms of the addressee’s 
existing set of assumptions, on which he must draw in order to make MM an appropriate P-set. In the 
case of the concept ‘postman’, the addressee will most likely already entertain assumptions to the effect 
that most homes have mail delivered to them by a single individual and that some people might be well 
enough acquainted with this person to exchange jokes with them. On this basis the addressee merely 
has to add to the common ground the assumption that the speaker has such a relationship with a single 
individual who delivers her mail, and it will become MM that there is a unique referent for ‘the 
postman’ in the P-set consisting of acquaintances of the speaker. 
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 Lyons is correct, however, in saying that Hawkins himself claims that his theory 
can directly account for certain uses of definiteness marking which, in reality, involve 
P-set presupposition failure with accommodation. For instance, Hawkins (1978, p. 
132) points to what he calls ‘referent-establishing relative clauses’ as a supposed 
subtype of ‘unfamiliar’ uses of definiteness marking (cf. examples  (16)– (17)). He 
gives the example in  (33), and Birner and Ward (1994, p. 93) give the similar example 
in  (34). 
 
(33) A: What’s wrong with Bill? 
B: Oh, the woman who dated him last night was nasty to him. 
(34) If you’re going into the bedroom, would you mind bringing back the big bag 
of potato chips that I left on the bed? 
 
In both cases we asked to imagine a context in which the addressee is not aware of the 
existence of the entity referred to by the definite NP in question before the moment of 
utterance. It seems perfectly plausible that a speaker might utter these sentences in 
such a context, and that the addressee might accept them without a moment’s thought. 
Nevertheless, if the above discussion is on the right track then these examples involve 
P-set presupposition failure with accommodation in just the same way as  (30)– (32): 
the definiteness marking in both  (33) and  (34) indicates that there is a MM P-set in 
which the referent of each definite NP is unique, but it has been specified that this is 
not the case – the appropriate P-set is not manifest to the hearer before the moment of 
utterance. However, all that is required to make the appropriate P-set MM is for the 
addressee to (quietly and without fuss) adjust the mutual cognitive environment such 
that it now contains the assumptions that there is a woman who dated Bill last night 
and that there is a big bag of potato chips on the bed, left there by the speaker. 
Contrast this with the unaccommodatable  (31)a, where the trivial parallel assumption 
that there is some Frenchman in existence in no way helps to make MM a P-set in 
which the particular entity referred to in  (31)a is unique. 
In fact, the argument could be made that even associative anaphoric uses of 
definite NPs as in  (3) (the car: the exhaust fumes) involve a degree of 
accommodation. After all, it is entirely possible for a car not to have any exhaust 
fumes. Arguably therefore, the assumption that the car referred to in  (3) should have 
exhaust fumes may not be MM, and thus an utterance of (3) could be infelicitous and 
require the addressee to accommodate by adding this assumption to the mutual 
cognitive environment after the fact. The point is perhaps clearer if we consider a 
more marginal case of associative anaphora as in  (35). 
 
(35) I looked at a house yesterday. The jacuzzi was rather small. 
 
Here it is less likely that the assumption that houses tend to have jacuzzis will 
ordinarily be part of the mutual cognitive environment of a pair of interlocutors, and 
therefore more likely that the addressee will have to accommodate accordingly in 
order for the utterance to succeed. 
What we see therefore is that, unsurprisingly, accommodation is a gradient 
phenomenon, at least when it comes to definite NPs with P-set presupposition failure. 
At one extreme, there are cases such as  (31)a where accommodation is next to 
impossible and the utterance is highly unlikely to be judged felicitous, because there 
are no assumptions which the addressee can add to the mutual cognitive environment 
in order to make MM a P-set in which the referent of the definite NP is unique. In the 
 18 
middle there are cases such as  (27) and  (30), where it is evident that there is P-set 
presupposition failure, but either accommodation is straightforwardly possible 
(assuming the addressee is willing to accommodate), or it is not required for the 
speaker’s larger rhetorical aims to be fulfilled. At the other extreme there are 
examples such as  (33)– (35) where accommodation is so straightforward that these 
utterances will most likely be judged felicitous even in case of P-set presupposition 
failure, or even where the MM-ness of the appropriate P-set is a borderline issue.
11
 
The key point is that not only do these accommodation cases not constitute 
counterexamples to the procedural theory of definiteness defended here, the nature of 
accommodation to P-set presupposition failure (and its limits) can only be properly 
understood in terms of this theory. 
  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
This article has argued, following Hawkins (1978, 1991), that the essence of 
definiteness is uniqueness within a pragmatically defined set of entities that is 
mutually manifest to speaker and addressee. I showed how Hawkins’ theory can 
profitably be reformulated in terms of procedural encoding, and that this and other 
relevance-theoretic concepts can serve to clarify some of the key concepts underlying 
the theory. Finally, I discussed a class of apparent counterexamples to the theory, 
which I argued were in fact cases that the theory rightly predicts to be acceptable only 
if the addressee is willing and able to accommodate. 
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